Tap a grade to define.
Neodymium
A sample scorecard for Neodymium-Praseodymium (NdPr). The rare-earth alloy behind guided weapons, electric drivetrains, and wind generators. Six checkpoints between the ground in California and a finished magnet on a missile fin.
Tier 4.
Foreign-dependent.
Domestic mining is intact. Domestic separation is thin. Domestic magnet capacity is just opening. The 2027 ban on Chinese-sourced magnets in defense systems is approaching faster than the chain can rebuild.
- Subject
- Neodymium-Praseodymium
- Auditor
- Maden Atlas
- Issued
- 2026.05.06
- Revision
- R-014
Six checkpoints. Each scored independently.
Mountain Pass, California. MP Materials extracts bastnäsite ore from the same pit Molycorp shut down in 2002 and restarted in 2018 after Chinese investors exited.
Single-point dependence. A fire, flood, or labor stoppage cuts domestic ore to zero overnight.
Separating mixed concentrate into individual rare-earth oxides is the bottleneck. MP Materials began on-site separation at Mountain Pass in 2023. No other domestic line is operating at scale.
Disruption sends US-mined concentrate to China for processing, defeating the point of mining at home.
Sintered magnets are the end product. The United States lost domestic capacity in the 1990s. MP Magnetics opened the first new plant in decades in Fort Worth in 2024. E-VAC Magnetics received a $111M federal award for a second plant in Sumter, South Carolina.
Output is an order of magnitude below defense program demand. Most magnets in current systems are still Chinese.
The 2024 defense authorization bars the Department of Defense from buying permanent magnets containing rare earths mined, refined, or sintered in China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. Programs are clearing through legacy magnet stocks today.
The trigger arrives before domestic supply is ready to backfill. A near-term gap is likely.
The Defense Logistics Agency keeps the National Defense Stockpile and resumed rare-earth purchases after 2020 following decades of drawdown. Current depth sits below the level required to bridge a sustained disruption at full program tempo.
The stockpile cannot substitute for a domestic chain. It buys months, not years.
Most prime contractors have visibility through their first three supplier tiers. The fourth and fifth tiers — where Chinese rare-earth processing typically enters — are opaque. Foreign exposure surfaces only on direct audit.
Programs reporting domestic sourcing may carry Chinese exposure four or five tiers deep, undetected until contract review.
The firms anchoring each node.
This is a sample. Atlas issues live scorecards on the materials your program actually depends on.Grades reflect the overall material chain. They do not assess the quality, capacity, or surge readiness of the firms named.